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INDIAN LAW 
KIRSCHLING v. UNITED STATES: ALLOTMENT 
PROCEEDS EXEMPT FROM GIFT TAX 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Enough to say that in our view this attempt to tax evi-
dences, at the least a sorry breach of faith with the Indians.1Il 
Kirschling v. United States2 presented the Ninth Circuit 
with an issue of first impression as to the applicability of federal 
gift tax to a transfer of timber allotment proceeds from a non-
competent Indians to a non-Indian. Reversing and remanding a 
district court summary judgment in favor of the government, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the transfer was exempt from gift tax. 
After obtaining special allotment timber cutting permits, 
plaintiff, Helen Kirschling negotiated the sale of $2,280,702.00 
worth of timber from her allotments on the Quinault Indian 
Reservation in Washington. 4 The proceeds were deposited in her 
Individual Indian Money account at the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA). Shortly thereafter she withdrew $850,000.00 in the 
form of a check from the BIA and converted $750,000.00 into 
cashier's checks payable to Duane Grandorff, a non-Indian:1 
On her 1976 gift tax return, Kirschling stated that the 
1. Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1954) aff'd 351 U.S. 1 (1956). 
2. 746 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1984)(per Farris, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J. and Craig, District Judge sitting by designation.). 
3. "The term 'noncompetent Indian' refers to one who holds land under a trust pat-
ent and who may not alienate or encumber that land without the consent of the United 
States." [d. at 513 n.1 (citing Hoptowit v. Comm'r, 709 F.2d 564,565 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). 
4. 746 F.2d at 513. 
5. [d. The IRS assessed a deficiency against Grandorft' alleging that the transfer was 
income for past service rendered. The Tax Court suit was stayed pending the outcome of 
this case. [d. at 514. 
251 
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transfer was exempt because it was a gift of Indian trust funds. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contested the exemption 
and assessed a deficiency of $174,112.50. After paying the defi-
ciency, Kirschling brought an action for a refund claiming that a 
gift of proceeds of allotted property was not taxable. The gov-
ernment contested the characterization of the transfer as a gift 
and additionally, argued that the General Allotment Act of 
18876 did not imply any exemption for such gifts. 
The district court granted partial summary judgment for 
the government on the issue of the taxability of gifts of allot-
ment proceeds and later set a trial date to determine whether 
this transfer was a gift or compensation for services rendered.7 
Prior to trial, the district court granted a summary judgment for 
the government on the grounds that the Internal Revenue Code 
barred the plaintiff from recovering on a theory different from 
that set forth in her refund claim.8 
II. BACKGROUND 
Cases on taxation related to Indian allotments have par-
tially focused on the congressional intent behind the General Al-
lotment Act of 1887.9 The Act served as the government's pri-
mary tool in efforts to assimilate tribal Indians by breaking up 
reservation lands.10 Parcels of reservation lands were allotted to 
individual Indians for the purposes of encouraging agricultural 
activity. The government held the allotments in trust for 
twenty-five years or longer at the discretion of the Secretary of 
the Interior.l1 
6. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§331-411 (1976)). 
7. 82-1 USTC (CCH) 1113,443 at 84,225 (W.O. Wa. Sept. 2, 1981). The district court 
held that the transfer was taxable because it was made to a non-Indian and because the 
allottee received the proceeds in fee simple prior to the transfer. 
8. 746 F.2d at 514. 
9. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-411 (1976)). 
10. The trust status of most allotted lands has been indefinitely extended by Execu-
tive Orders. Exec. Order No. 10,191, 15 Fed. Reg. 8889 (1950); 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970). 
See also 25 U.S.C. § 462 which states that "[tlhe existing periods of trust placed on 
Indian land and any restriction or alienation thereof are extended and continued until 
otherwise directed by Congress." 
11. By the time the policy of assimilation through allotment programs ended with 
the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 48 Stat. 984, as amended 25 
U.S.C. §§ 461-69 (1970), most reservations had become a checkerboard of individual In-
dian allotments, tribal lands and non-Indian homesteads composed of non-allotted or 
formerly allotted lands. The IRA sought to reestablish tribes as self-governing entities by 
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During the trust period the Indian had limited control over 
the land, requiring government approval to sell, lease, or encum-
ber it. At the end of the trust period the Act provided for con-
veyance by a patent "discharged of said trust and free of all 
charge or encumberance whatsoever."12 The Act also allowed the 
Secretary to issue a patent in fee simple at any time the Indian 
allottee was adjudged "competent and capable of managing his 
or her own affairs."ls Such a determination was recognized by 
issuance of a certificate of competency. In 1906 Congress 
amended the Act to remove "all restrictions as to sale, encum-
brance, or taxation" of allotted lands received in fee simple.l• 
Disregarding the general language of the General Allotment 
Act, the Tenth Circuit in Jones u. Taunah1r. held that federal 
income tax applied to income earned by Indians from their allot-
ments unless explicity statutory language exempted that in-
come.18 When the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion 
on indistinguishable facts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve the tension between the requirements of explicit lan-
guage for granting tax exemptions and the rule of statutory con-
struction requiring ambiguities to be resolved in favor of 
Indians.17 
In 1956, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Squire u 
Capoemanl8 which seemed to be the definitive answer on federal 
taxation of income derived from Indian allotments. With facts 
8ubstituting tribal ownership for the allotment system. For a discussion of the tax impli-
cations of these shifts in characterization of Indian trust lands, see Fiske and Wilson, 
Federal Taxation of Indian Income From Restricted Indian Lands, 10 LAND & WATER 
L. REV. 63 (1975). 
12. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). 
13. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976). 
14.Id. 
15. 186 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1951). The Indian allottees in this case had received 
income from agricultural leases, oil and gas rentals and royalties and from an oil lease 
bonus, all directly derived from their allotments. 
16. Id. at 448. The dissent held that the combination of the General Allotment Act 
and the applicable treaty allowed exemption of the income from oil and gas royalties 
though not of the interest on the income. Id. at 449-50. (Phillips, C.J., dissenting in 
part.) 
17. "We may add that while the court below appeared to regard as distinguishable 
the decision of the Tenth Circuit. . . we can see no ground upon which the holding can 
be distinguished. Rather, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Phillips." 
Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d 349, 350 (9th Cir. 1951). 
18. 351 U.S. 1 (1956). 
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strikingly similar to Kirschling, the Court held that timber sale 
proceeds from an allotment were exempt from capital gains 
tax. Ie It rejected the assertion that this was an ordinary tax case 
in which exemptions to tax laws must be express in order to be 
valid.lIo Interpreting the applicable treaty, the General Allotment 
Act and congressional policy towards Indians, the Court found 
that Congress intended to subject Indians allotments to all taxes 
only after a patent in fee simple had been issued to the allottee. 
Through the General Allotments Act Congress expressed its in-
tent that income directly derived from the allotted land be ex-
empt from all taxation. 21 Without such an implication of exemp-
tion, the policy of assimiliation, the stated purpose of the Act, 
would have been hindered. 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the lower court's con-
clusion that the General Allotment Act could not be interpreted 
to exempt allotment proceeds from gift taxation.lIli The court 
19. The Indian allottees in both Capoeman and Kirschling were members of the 
Quinault Indian Tribe and all sought relief from taxes imposed on income received from 
sale of timber from their allotments. The most interesting difference in the cases is the 
amount of income involved in each case. Proceeds from the sale of trees from 93.5 acres 
of allotted lands brought the Capoemans $15,080.80 in 1943. 351 U.S. at 4. 
The system of timber sales at the time was managed by the government to the dis-
advantage of individual sellers who received between one-third and one-half of the pre-
vailing market value for their timber. This was because the government placed enormous 
tracts of forest lands, including federal holdings as well as Indian trust lands, of varying 
quality and accessibility up for bid at one time. [d. at 4 n. 7. Kirschling negotiated her 
own sale thus receiving more than $2.2 million for her timber. The district court point-
edly noted that she could rely on Copoeman to "avoid income tax on the substantial 
income she must have realized" as though the amount of income had a relationship to 
the doctrine permitting tax exemptions. 82-1 USTC 1113,443 at 84,228 (emphasis added). 
20. We agree with the government that Indians are citizens and that in 
ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial 
legislation, they are subject to the payment of income taxes as 
are other citizens. We also agree that, to be valid, exemptions 
to tax laws should be clearly expressed. But we cannot agree 
that the taxability of respondents in these circumstances is 
unaffected by the treaty, the trust patent or the General Allot-
ment Act. 
351 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added.) 
21. The Court found that the language of section 5 of the General Allotment Act, 
"free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever" could be reasonably interpreted to mean 
exemption from taxation. 351 U.S. at 7. In addition amendment to section 6 specifically 
included exemption from taxation as one of the restrictions to be removed only upon 
transfer of title in fee simple. [d. 
22. 746 F.2d at 514. 
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noted that although Capoeman concerned a capital gains tax, 
the Ninth Circuit had previously held that it was not to be ap-
plied narrowly.23 In fact, the language of the holding specifically 
exempted allotments from all taxation.24 
Analogizing a line of cases exempting transfer of allotments 
and allotments proceeds from estate tax, the court found sup-
port for its view that Capoeman applied.211 Since the purpose of 
the gift tax is to prevent avoidance of estate taxes by inter vivos 
transfers of property, these analogies were properly persuasive 
in this case of first impression.2s Cases holding that ambiguous 
language which could reasonably be interpreted to confer a tax 
exemption for Indians must be so construed provided additional 
support for the applicability of the Capoeman interpretation of 
the General Allotment Act. 27 
The court's analysis then shifted to whether or not the al-
lottee had received the property in fee simple prior to making 
the gift. Rejecting the government's argument that issuance of 
the check by the BIA constituted receipt of allotment proceeds 
in fee simple, the court found the statutory requirements for is-
suance of a patent in fee simple unmet.28 The General Allotment 
Act required either that the statutory trust period expire29 or 
that the Indian be determined to be competent before a patent 
could be issued.30 Since those sections expressed congressional 
intent to protect noncompetent Indians from all taxation until 
such a patent issued, Kirschling's income from the sale of timber 
was exempt from all taxation, including gift tax. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Kirschling, the tension between strict construction of tax 
23. Stevens v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 714, 744 (9th Cir. 1971). 
24. "[U)ntil such time as the [fee simple) patent is issued, the allotment shall be 
free from all taxes." 746 F.2d at 515 (citing Capoeman 351 U.S. at 8). 
25. 746 F.2d at 151 (citing Asenap v. U.S., 283 F.Supp. 566 (W.O. Oklahoma 1968); 
Nash v. Wiseman, 227 F.Supp. 552 (W.O. Oklahoma 1963». 
26. 746 F.2d at 515. 
27. [d. The Ninth Circuit in Stevens had noted the strong language in Capoeman 
urging favorable construction of statutes touching upon the special relationship between 
the government and the Indians. 452 F.2d at 744. The Supreme Court in Capoeman 
noted its previous decision in Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). "Doubtful expres-
sions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are wards of the 
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." [d. at 367. 
28. 746 F.2d at 516. 
29. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). 
30. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976). 
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exemption statutes and liberal construction of statutes and trea-
ties concerning Indians is once again resolved clearly in favor of 
the noncompetent Indian. The court will not favorably consider 
arguments that Indian tax cases sought to be resolved without 
reference to those statutes and treaties which specifically outline 
the trust relationship. Following Capoeman, the court found the 
statutory language to be sufficient to allow the exemption.81 
The unresolved issue for which Kirschling and similar cases 
will be instructive, is the tax status of restricted Indian lands, 
such as those reacquired from allottees under the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, from which an individual Indian derives in-
come.8l1 The trends in analysis by the courts towards considera-
tion of all relevant legislation, treaties and general Indian policy 
serves as a warning to the IRS to expand its consistently narrow 
view of Indian tax case precedent.88 To continue to argue that 
tax exemptions for Indians must be supported by specific statu-
tory language is to ignore the judicial deference to the guardian-
ward relationship as it is related to taxation.84 
Margaret Crow* 
31. 746 F.2d at 516. 
32. The Indian Reorganization Act provided for restoration of non-allotted lands to 
tribal ownership, exchanges of Indian and non-Indian lands to effectuate consolidation 
within reservations and transfers of allotted lands from individual Indian ownership 
back to tribal ownership. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4634a, 463e, 464. (1970). 
33. See Fiske and Wilson, supra note 10. 
34. The IRS interpretation of the Capoeman decision is expressed in Revenue Rul-
ing 67-284, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 55, which sets out a five part test for determining whether 
an exemption for income derived from an allotment will be granted: 
Id. at 56·57. 
(1) The land in question is held in trust by the United States 
Government; 
(2) such land is restricted and allotted and is held for an in-
dividual noncompetent Indian, and not for a tribe; 
(3) the income is "derived directly" from the land; 
(4) the statute, treaty or other authority involved evinces 
congressional intent that the allotment be used as a 
means of protecting the Indian until such time as he be-
comes competent; and 
(5) the authority in question contains language indicating 
clear congressional intent that the land, until conveyed in 
fee simple to the allottee, is not to be subject to taxation. 
If one or more of these five test is not met, and if the 
income is not otherwise exempt by law, it is subject to 
Federal income taxation. 
"It is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended to tax the ward for benefit of the 
guardian." Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418, 420 (1935). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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DONOVAN v. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL FARM: 
NINTH CIRCUIT APPLIES OSHA TO INDIAN FARM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, l the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act2 (the Act) 
applied to an Indian farm due to the absence of congressional 
intent to exclude Indian enterprises from coverage. In reversing 
an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the 
Commission) decision vacating citations and penalties assessed 
against the farm,S the court held that the statute was enforcea-
ble despite arguments that the Tribe's inherent sovereign power 
to exclude non-Indians barred application.· 
In October, 1978, a compliance officer from the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted an 
inspection of two grain elevators on the Coeur d' Alene Tribal 
Farm, a commercial enterprise wholly owned and operated by 
the Tribe on their reservation in northern Idaho. 1I Citations were 
issued for twenty-one alleged violations and fines totalling 
$185.00.8 While not challenging the facts upon which the cita-
tions were based, the Tribe claimed the Act had no application 
to an Indian enterprise.7 
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the citations 
and penalties.8 Upon review, the Commission remanded the case 
for reargument in light of their recent decision in Navajo Forest 
Products Industries (NFPI) which held the Act inapplicable to 
1. No. 84-7031, slip op. (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1985)(per Sneed, J.; the other panel mem-
bers were Wright, J., and Alarcon, J.). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). 
3. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1705 (Nov. 16, 1983). 




8. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 1980 O.S.H.D. (25,5P)54 (May 20, 1980)(per Stuller). 
257 
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an enterprise on an Indian reservation.9 The ALJ reaffirmed the 
earlier decision, distinguishing NFPI on the ground that the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe had no treaty upon which to base its claim 
of sovereign powers. IO The Commission reversed and vacated the 
citations on the ground that the Act did not apply to tribal en-
terprises because of a tribe's inherent right to exclude non-Indi-
ans.n The government then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The primary Supreme Court cases relied upon in Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Farm were Federal Power Commission v. Tusca-
rora Indian Nation12 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.18 
These cases outline the origin and scope of tribal sovereign 
powers. 
Tuscarora held that the Federal Power Act authorized the 
taking of twenty-two percent of Tuscarora lands which were to 
be inundated by the construction of a dam.14 The Indians ar-
gued that the government could not condemn the land without 
explicit statutory language authorizing application of the Act to 
Indian lands. However, the Court found that the lands in ques-
tion were not "tribal lands embraced within an Indian reserva-
tion" and thus not excludable under provisions of the Act. 11I 
Therefore, the exercise of eminent domain powers did not con-
flict with any rights guaranteed by treaty and was permissible. IS 
The Tuscaroras had no treaty with the United States govern-
ment upon which they could rely to argue their sovereign rights 
were infringed by the taking of these lands. The lack of a treaty 
9. 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2094, aff'd 692 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1982). The Commission 
decision in this case will be referred to as NFPI to distinguish it from the appellate court 
decision which will be referred to as Navajo Forest Products. 
10. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 1982 O.S.H.D. 1125,962 (Feb. 16, 1982)(per Stuller). 
11. 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1708. 
12. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
13. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
14. 362 U.S. at 124 (Black, J., dissenting). 
15. Section 4e of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
791a-828c, prohibited the taking of reserved land if such taking would "interfere or be 
inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired." Al-
though Section 3 (2) defined reservation as including "tribal lands embraced within In-
dian reservation" the majority decided that the Tuscarora Indian lands did not meet 
that definition because the Indians held the lands in fee simple. The dissent found this 
definition to be "wholly artificial and limited." 362 U.S. at 127 (Black, J., dissenting). 
16. 362 U.S. at 124. 
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has served as a distinguishing factor between this case and later 
ones reaching opposite results. 17 
In Merrion, the Court examined whether the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe had the power to levy severance taxes on the oil 
and gas production of non-Indians on reservation lands. IS In sus-
taining the tax, the Court characterized the right alternatively as 
one of self-governmenP9 or as derived from the right to exclude 
non-Indians from the reservation.20 The Court stated that the 
right to exclude non-Indians was a "hallmark" of sovereignty.21 
Both rights were deemed essential to self-government and terri-
torial management.22 The reservation in Merrion, like the one in 
Tuscarora, was not created by a treaty with explicit language 
recognizing its sovereign powers.23 The Court noted that "the 
Tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which 
its reservation is established."24 
During the hearings on Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, a case 
with strikingly similar facts came before the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission, ultimately progressing to the 
Tenth Circuit. In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Indus-
tries,2& the court upheld a Commission decision that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act did not apply to a tribal enterprise 
because it violated the tribe's sovereign right to exclude non-In-
dians. 28 The government had argued that under the Tuscarora 
holding, the Act applied to the Navajo Forest Products Indus-
tries, a timber conversion facility wholly owned and operated by 
the Navajos on their reservation in New Mexico.27 The court 
held that by implication Merrion overruled Tuscarora at least as 
to the statement relied upon by the government that "it is now 
well-settled by many decisions of this Court that a general stat-
ute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their 
17. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
18. 455 U.S. at 133. 
19. Id. at 139. 
20. Id. at 144. 
21. Id. at 141. 
22.ld. 
23. The reservation was established by the Executive Order of 1887. I C. Kappler, 
Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904) (order of President Cleveland). 
24. 455 U.S. at 134. 
25. 692 F.2d 709 (1982). 
26. Id. at 714. 
27. Id. at 710. 
9
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property. "28 
The court held that article II of the 1868 treaty between the 
United States and the Navajo Tribe, which recognized the right 
to exclude non-Indians from the reservation, applied to OSHA 
inspectors.29 Tuscarora was distinguished due to the lack of a 
treaty in that case. The application of the statute did not abro-
gate any treaty rights which would have been the result of appli-
cation of the Act in the instant case. However, the court empha-
sized that the Court in Merrion had clearly stated that the right 
to exclude need not be explicitly expressed in a treaty in order 
to be enforceable. so 
The Commission's final decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
FarmSl reached several conclusions as to why the Act did not 
apply to the farm.s2 The Tribe argued that the Commission's 
NFPI decision governed and that the Act did not apply because 
it did not express congressional intent to abrogate tribal sover-
eign powers. The government argued that NFPI, at that time on 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit, ought to be overruled.ss The Com-
mission noted two reasons why the lack of a treaty did not dis-
tinguish this case from NFPI. First, treaty making with Indian 
tribes ended in 1871,s4 two years before the reservation was es-
tablished by executive order.311 The executive order and the con-
gressional approval of Articles of Agreement in 1887 served as 
recognition of tribal sovereignty. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, the specific right to exclude non-Indians is a "fundamen-
tal sovereign attribute intimately tied to a tribe's ability to pro-
tect the integrity and order of its territory and of its 
members."ss Specific governmental recognition of such a right 
was not essential to protect it from abrogation. 
Finding no material factual distinctions between NFPI and 
28. Id. at 713. 
29. Id. at 711-12. 
30. Id. at 712-13. 
31. 11 O.S.H. Caa. (BNA) 1705 (Nov. 16. 1983). 
32. Id. at 1708. 
33.Id. 
34. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3. 1871. ch. 120. § 1. 16 Stat. 544. 566 (codified in 
part at 25 U.S.C. § 71.) 
35. Exec. Order No. 1111 (1873). 
36. 692 F.2d at 712 (citing Merrion. 455 U.S. at 141). 
10
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the case before it, the Commission again rejected the govern-
ment's arguments that the Tuscarora rule should apply and held 
for the farm. 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit accepted the government's argument that 
Tuscarora applied and proceeded to examine three exceptions to 
the rule. Although silent on the issue of its applicability to In-
dian tribes, the Act would be held to apply unless it (1) touched 
exclusive rights of self-government; (2) abrogated treaty rights; 
or (3) showed an intent in its legislative history to exclude Indi-
ans.87 If any of these exceptions were satisfied then the statute 
must expressly state its intent to apply to Indians, a test which 
this Act did not meet. 
The court rejected the argument that tribally owned enter-
prises, such as the farm, fell within the scope of the "tribal self-
government" exception. The court defined the exception as ap-
plying only to intramural matters.88 The fact that such enter-
prises primarily serve the goals of improving economic and social 
conditions on the reservation, with the profit motive secondary, 
did not impress the court which characterized the farm as "a 
normal commercial farming enterprise. "89 
Within this same exception, the court entertained but re-
jected the proposition that the right to exclude non-Indians was 
a "fundamental aspect" of sovereignty.4o Distinguishing Merrion 
on its facts, the court stated that although Merrion recognized 
the right to exclude as a "hallmark" of sovereignty, the opinion 
did not address Congress' ability to alter those sovereign rights. 
It rejected the Indian's contention that such alterations must be 
express rather than implied.41 
Addressing the treaty rights exception, the court held that 
the lack of a treaty or other document signed by the United 
States specifically guaranteeing the right to exclude was fatal to 
37. Slip op. at 138-39 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. 
denied 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). 
38. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, No. 84-7301, slip op. at 139. 
39.Id. 
40.Id. 
41. Id. at 139-40. 
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the claim that the Act must expressly state its intent to apply to 
Indians. In rejecting Navajo Forest the court stated that "to 
whatever extent the Tenth Circuit's decision is not tied to the 
existence of an express treaty right, we disagree with it."·2 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This opinion gives cursory treatment to the essential issue 
of why a power, recognized as sovereign, will be protected only 
where a treaty is found. Besides the fact that many reservations 
were created without a treaty and the fact that treaties vary in 
specificity, this holding ignores the Tenth Circuit's observation 
that the treaty recognized rather than created the rights in 
question.·8 
Under its plenary powers Congress can abrogate the sover-
eign rights of Indians tribes to exclude non-Indians. However, by 
analogizing to cases which hold that for a general statute to ab-
rogate treaty rights congressional intent must be clearly ex-
pressed,·· the court ought to require the same for abrogation of 
inherent sovereign rights. Even though the existence of tribal 
enterprises is well-known, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act does not specify application to Indian reservations. To dis-
tinguish essentially similar tribal enterprises on the basis of exis-
tence of a treaty is arbitrary and unfair to the tribes. Specific 
language in the statute would lead to fair and consistent applica-
tion and would avoid artificial distinctions between reservations. 
Margaret Crow* 
42. Id. at 140 n.3. As to the third factor from the Farris test, neither side presented 
arguments that there existed in the legislative history of the Act any manifestation of 
congressional intent to exclude Indians. 
43. 692 F.2d at 712. 
44. Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Reuiew of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As 
Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 
CALIF. L. REV. 601, 623-30, (1975). 
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